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Pujya Dr. K.C. Varadachari - Volume -8


Śrī Vedānta Desika, the greatest exponent of the Viśstādvaita of Śrī Rāmānuja wrote the Paramatabhanga in 1320A.D. at Tiruvahindrapuram. It is the 31st .rahasya among the thirty tow written by him. It is a primer of the several darsanas as well as an introduction to the study of Viśstādvaita. It is written for the followers of the system of Viśstādvaita as well s for local consumption and as such is written in a fluent manipravala (that is a mixture of Sanskrit and Tamil) language. The work displays all the qualities of dialectical skill and encyclopedic learning for which he earned the unique distinction of being called Srvatantra-svatantra  and Kavitarkika-kesari.


            This chapter as compared with  the Sarvadarsanasamgraha of Madhvacarya reveals that on general principle there is agreement about the tenets of the system under consideration though in the details in exposition there are slight additions and subtractions. The difference in he approach to the subject of expounding the systems is, however, very clear. Śrī Vedānta Desika, before he starts, wears his spectacles, so to speak, of his system, and then, braces himself to the task of expounding the other systems and demolishing them with their own arguments. His view is that self consistency is not to be found in any system other  than his own. The inner defect of each system is what he points out with ruthless logic. It is thus that  the Lokayata  doctrine happens to be criticized on the basis of its own logical inconsistencies. The chapter itself comprises of two parts, the purvapaksa and the siddhānta of Viśstādvaita in relation to this Cārvāka  system. In other words, the chapter, first states the positions of the Cārvākas and then shows the reactions of the Visistadvaitin to it. No statement is left without answer so that all the doubts that might arise in tile mind of a cārvākan-minded Visistadvaitin might be dispelled. Śrī Vedānta desika reveals his acquaintance with the Sūtras of Vatsayana’s Kamasastra as well s Kautilya’s Arthasastra.


            The spirit of the materialist is wide-spread. Man is first and foremost a material being. The Epicurean theory in the west was characterized by a certain amount of scientific unrest and displeasure with dogmatic belief The materialistic explanations of the origin of the world s exemplified by the explanations of the origin of the world as exemplified by the hylozoists in Greek Philosophy continued by Epicurus and Lucretius have their parallels in Indian thought. But both of them so far as the scientific pursuit was concerned were scotched by dogmatism and fundamentatlism. The truth of the materialist cannot be denied. Reality cannot cease to be perceptual also. Matter has a reality and it is perceptual, and that is why all  idealism must explain perception s real or at lest phenomentally real (vyavaharika) and not mere illusion or self-projection. Truth must be experienced and the vision of the materialist is that Reality must become a vision, Brahman must become something  visible. The divya-darsana, the seeing of God with purified eyes1 and hearing with purified ears is the ideal of the scientifically-minded materialist. That along with this high ideal there have occurred degradations of this ideal goes without saying. There is a fateful tendency about all good intentions to gather round them a number of parasitic unholy ones.





            Now we shall proceed to state first the Lokayata system, among the systems unsustainable  by logic, which deludes the full-witted and is opposed to orthodox systems, and then refute it (on its own grounds).



1.      What they (the Lokayatas) say is:

Pratyaksa, perception, is the only authority (for knowledge). It is a fact conceded by all that even in these perceptions, faults in the instruments (karanas namely the sense-organs like the eye etc.,) are sometimes referred to the objects themselves.


            2. In inference etc., there is  delusion that they are independent means of knowledge, because of their accidental relation. Even if some of these (inferences and scriptural knowledge etc.,) have authority (i.e. truth), (they could be shown to derive htat authoritativeness) from perception alone.

1Cf Jaina conception of Pratyaksa, nd intuition of Bergson.


            3. The mantras (magico-mystical chants) used to cure poisons, nd other yantras (instruments of the same kind as the previous), are facts of perceptionon a par with  the medicines and sun-light and moon-light influences on sunstones and moon-stones; the lokayata doctrine accepts (as we have said) only perception, and only such authority of experiences which are proved by it (i.e. Which are not contradicted by facts of perception and are substantiated by it).


            4. It is only by taking perception as authority of right knowledge (pramana) that Brhaspati has stated the following sūtras :


(i)           Ahta lokayatam: Now hten the Lokayata doctrine.

(ii)         Prthvyatejovayuriti tattvam: Earth, Water, Fire, Air are the elements.

(iii)       Tebhyahcaitanyam kinvadibhyah madaśaktivat: From that (arises) consciousness, like the intoxicating power from the combination of ferments1.

1 Cf. Sarvadarsanasamgrapha, trans. Cowell, who quotes Colebrooke’s quotation of Sankara on Lokayata.

“ The faculty of thought results from the modification of the aggregate elements, in like manner as sugr with ferment and other ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor, and as betel areca, lime and extract


            This theory He (Brhaspati) got published through Cārvāka (the sweet-tongued) and others.


            5. Even Akasa, either could be accepted as an (original) element. Since with the help of Pratyaksa htat is accepted by all schools (of thought) as the menas towards realization  of ends of desired, after walth etc., we are enabled to realize such other ends lso as those belonging to ethical life, theft and love and other sciences, which are well-established in this world. As such they are not subjects of dispute (being self-evident to all).


            Since we cannot accept anything beyond this world on the basis of our perceptive authority, and therefore cannot refute our experiences on te basis of such super-world experience (or reports which we do not and cannot have), we should live happily here (and now)(without caring for the herefter and Heavens) even like the cows and other animals which live according to nature (and do not bother about the morrow). The above couself of the Guru (Deva-Guru Brhaspati) is most acceptable, if only all the theorists would lay their hands on their hearts(i.e. consult hteir real wishes and desires), and therefore this able doctrine is the most helpful to all (parama-hitam).

catecchu chewed have an exhilarating property not found in their substances severally”.


6. It is an illusion to say that1

(i)           novel-like kavyas,

(ii)         the creation of castes,

(iii)       the performance of duties that are said to belong to them which we neither see nor understand

(iv)        the renunciation of present wealth (for the sake of a speculative wealth in the future,

(v)          the causing of suffering to the body (through practices of Yoga),

(vi)        living by begging,

(vii)      shaving off hair completely or wearing of braided hir and other pain-causing duties, re capable of causing (ultimate) happiness. Other systems which subscribe to such (a strange and false) doctrine are unacceptable to the intelligent minded.


7. Those who are devoid of intelligence and courage(of their convictions)—that being the common nature of life in this world are bring ledbyd eceitful means to follow others. It is for you to act on the basis of the principle “As is the king so shall the people be?” “As all people (dress or) behave, so shall you.” (In this consists happiness).


8. It is only if a person considers that there is  soul different from the body, breath, inner digestive fire, sense-organs and other parts of the body nd the elements, (and) that he is one who has to take up other bodies (as results of his present and past karma) and understanding rightly, these, is he afraid of going to Narka na dohter (dark spheres), there would be any necessity for him to cease eto injure others. (If you do not make such a distinction and do not believe in karma and rebirth and suffering in Naraka and other places, there is no need t fear to injure others.)


9. To leave the woman (you love and have), to give up pansupari and bed-comforts etc., which cnstitute the actually enjoyable heaven, and to seek instead the unseen Heaven through fasting, saltless diet etc., means unnecessary (unconscionable) suffering. (Obviously the bird in the hand is worth two in the bush; cf. Vatsayana Kamasūtra: I. Ii.29: varamadya kapotassvo mayurat.)1


10. The body is the Self (atman) is (the conclusion) arrived at through actual perception, through such statements as ‘I am stout’ ‘I am lean.’ Those who try to deny this (Samanadhikaranya-identity) would have to deny such perceptual facts as ‘fire is hot’ etc., (also). When we say ‘My body’, it means that my soul is my body in the same sense as the statement ‘the body of the stone image’ (where the stone and the image are identical materially)2

1Sarvadarsanasamgraha, Anganalinganadi yanyam sukham Purusarthah.

2 the form  of the stone htat is the image is in no sense the equivalent of he matter namely the stone itself, nor is it equivalent ot the self which is withing guiding and directing the body;





            11. If it be asked whether there could ever be consciousness in any unconscious substnce? (the Cārvāka replies) that since there are no substances other than earth, water, fire and air, and sicne it is by their- accidental (or chance) conjunction  there arises consciousness, as in the cases of:


i.                    intoxicating power from fermenting liquids,

ii.                  the arising of poisonous power form te combination of strange substances (severally non-poisonous).

iii.                the medicinal results arising from powers,

iv.                 the red colour that results from  the combination of lime and turmeric.

v.                   the appearance of hardness in the snow-ball (which is merely made up of water,1

vi.                 the appearance of hot and sweet tastesa nd smells and touch (which are not in those things?)

vii.               Pictures that cause delight,

viii.             the sharp-oints in thorns and their curvedness,


Consciousness is due to the immanent power within their natures, svabhava, from which  arise its evolutes viz. happiness etc., their increase or decrease relative to the attainment o what is desired such as the destruction of what is hated, and due to action nd withdrawal item action.

1 This example is peculiar to Śrī Vedānta Desika, not found in Sarvadarsanasamgraha.


   NOVEMBER, 2004  BETWEE12. Those, who do not accept the quality that is called Consciousness, all the same affirm that for the production of it, mere conjunction of several instruments, (samagri) within he body operate as auxiliary causes to bring it about, just like the doll that is mde to speak nd to perform (gestures). This is like the opening and closing of the lotus buds, expiration and inspiration of breath in us or closing and opening of the eye-lids which occur (in autonomous actions).


            13. Because we see that a branch  of a tree when transplanted grows there, we cannot say  that there is another soul1 there.


            14. To those who hold that we get bodies such as are caused by merit and demerit (papa-punya), (we reply) it is impossible to say what special causes, men, animals and trees etc., have had in the past that marks out their differences from one another.2

1 The phenomenon of a branch of a tree (rose for example) which when transplanted develops or sprouts out of its own accord individually shows that the theory  of one soul pervading an entire tree o rbeing is wrong. The bifurcation of souls or existencesis a common phenomenon in cell divison in biology. The same question about souls will also arise there.

2 When we speak of a cause, we should not speak of an indefinite and unidentifiable or vague one. It must always be a special cause, well-defined, in the presence of which the effect happens and in the absence of which it does not. Anvaya-vyatireki.


            15. Since sorrow is not(seen to be) he result of sin, to those thinkers who say that freedom consists in getting rid of the causes of sorrow, the giving-u o their bodies alone will be freedom.


            16. And to those who hold supreme bliss alone to be the mark of freedom (moksa), that which is mentioned in the passage beginning with “Thousand.”1 will be moksa.


            17. The self which is characterized by cognitive, affective and conative activities, which is (said to be) immortal, need not be accepted by those theories which


i.                    refute all differences between substance and quality because of the conflicts between sources of right knowledge,

ii.                  which accet the doctrine of momentary existence of things, because of the desctruction of things without any cause,

iii.                which deny cause-effect relation, because of the inability to say anything as to the nature of the inner potency (svabhava) in any thing,

iv.                 which  oppose the externality of things known because of the fact of their being known,

v.                   which hold htat because it is impossible to know all, therefore all are absolutely non-existent.1


1Sahara bhga sandarsanam moksam” sexual enjoyment with a thousand womena lone is Liberty, bliss, is conquest. Vatsayana I.ii.45. Indra is cursed to have thousand bhagas. Sarvadarsanasamgraha: Anganalinganadijanyam Sukham eva Purusarthah.


18. Therefore they (carvākas) say that casting aside all fear of right and wrong, one must ass out of existence enjoying all those perceptible enjoyments that come to one unstriven for, nd those htat are striven for by oneself, like plants and animals.


19. This theory was taught by Prajapti to Virocana (Chandogya Upanisad VIII.8.4), and he, in turn, taught this to all his kin. So that this is called the Upanisad  of Asuras by the Vedas themselves. Further this is the system fo Brhaspati who is th paragon of intelligent persons, having connections with the two divisions (devas and asuras), who has been accepted by those accepting the Vedas (as authority).


20. Jabali also inwardly accepted this Lokayata system and on one occasion preached it. (Ramāyāna).




1 This clearly shows that Buddhist view f momentariness, the Yogacara view of solipsism or the Alaya-vij˝ānā idealism, are clearly close allies of Carvāka doctrine. The criterion htat if some things are wrongly perceived  all are wrong is at the bottom of this view. This criterion is at the bottom of the Advaita view of reaity itself which is htat because there re cases of illusion, all reality is to be stigmatized as illusion. This is the Carvāka agreement with Advaita. Tehe development of this concept of carvākas frm mere denial of scriptural authority, from the  subservience of reason to authority to the statement of perception as authority, from this to the denial of cause-effect relation because perception is momentary, from this the transition to the idealistic position and illusionism all comprising the several steps of Materialism re clearly stated.


            21. In the Mahabharata,1 whilst describing Kanva’s Asrama, it hs been declred that the Lokayta doctrine is very acceptable: as compared with other theories that it is superior.


            22. Those persons who seek to tbe friendly only with those who re continuously performing without any conscience (anutapa) actions that will ends opposed to righteousness, also come under the (sway of this ) system.


            23. Those (alws) which re established by rules (kings), by customfo the world, are to be worshipped accordingly as Lords. There is no need for any other special dress of acara (such as exist for monks and other religious sects).


            24. Therefore, since this system is in consonnce with the authorities and reason also, and since other systems accept this system, they (Lokaytas) say that this  is a very important doctrine (which ought to be accepted by all sensible people).2


1Cf. Mahabharata, Śānti prvan (1410 ff) mentions a Raksasa, Carvāksa  by name, who in the disguise o a Brahmin Sanyāsin spoke materialist doctrines to Yudhisthira.

2 Lokayata doctrine is rather fully dealt with in vatsayana’s Kamasūtras. Śrī Vedānta Desika seems to have derived the main aspects of the later doctrine of the Carvākas form it since he quote it also. (Vatsayana Sūtras I.ii.18-30). Sarvadrsna samgraha I, quotes instead of Chandogya, the Brhadaranyaka II.iv.12 regarding the destruction of the individual soul. It also shows that Purusartha is Pleasure, sex enjoyment mainly.

            The Nyāya Sūtras II.57 teach that Vedas re self-contradictory and tautologous.


            We now proceed to refute this System:--


            25. It is impossible to accept the  (carvāka) view that perception is the only authority (for right knowledge   NOVEMBER, 2004  BETWEEN




V. SHANTHA RAM, S/O. ŚRĪ V. knowledge through inference (anumana) and scripture. Since such knowledge is not characterized by doubt, nor vitiated by any fault, and since their view that there is non-existence of special reasons (section 14) (i.e. their view tht because some inference are wrong all inferences are wrong, and that there is special reason for saying that some are true) involves them in self-contradictions, and as such is self-refuting,1 like perception, even inference etc., must be granted to be authorities for knowledge. If this be accepted, even Pratyaksa cannot become an authority (that is irrefutable).

            Śrī Vedānta Desika in so far as he stresses the four fold characteristics of Lokayta points out that other systems do owe their  inspirations to Carvkas doctrine.

i.                    Denial of Veda is common to Buddhism, Samkhya and Nyāya (earlier).

ii.                  Pleasure as Summum Bonum is exclusively its own; others preach absence of misery s the goal.

iii.                The denial of a Self is common to Buddhism, and as also to be doctrine of momentariness.

iv.                 The denial of inference is a consequence of the doctrine of momentariness, and as a consequence also the denial of rebirth.


1 In this, the  Cārvākas refute themselves for a further reason mentioned in Sarvadarsanasamgraha trans. Cowell. P.3 hey accept in  the case of pleasure, pleasure which is never divorced from pain. The universal condemnation through inference is wrong. If it be said that in inference and sastra, because we perceive some defects, even in the rest, (there ought to be defect) and that therefore the theory of chance alone is true, then, on the same ground this criticism is valid against Pratyaksa too, (since not all perception is free from defect or illusion).


            To those who hold that there re no other sources of right knowledge than  Pratyaksa, we reply that they themselves infer that ‘if they eat, their hunger would vanish’, and then, proceed to take their food etc. Believing in the words or a ‘friend’; which are not perceptions nor inference for themselves,1 wherefore do they speed their wealth without any hesitation?


            26. Though in the Sciences of Magic, Medicine, Sculpture, Astronomy and Omens which serve practical ends wherein we arrive at no (perceptive) knowledge on the principle of agreement and difference (anvayavyatireki), we find that for any skilful person they do grant results. In the same manner, those sciences which del with the transcendental world, should not be distrusted (because they are imperceptible).


            27. We advise those who have such doubts, a according to the maxim “If the other world were existent, to say that it is nonexistent is to perish,” it is not right to violate scriptural authority (on the mere basis of it imperceptibility).

1 The criticism of Vedānta Desika here I shrewd, as it points out that in action Lokayata are disloyal to their own tenets, even as they charge other systems of being disloyal to their inward convictions. (sec 5)


            It I necessary at this point to ponder over the (following) vere.


“The Scripture I knowlable through perception. In it the knowledge o human ends (purusantha) aries. In it there is no caue for any fault. Therefore, charma, adharma, soul and self, and other mentioned in the scriptures do not get repudiated by Perception, not even in the Carvka Sytem.

Therefore O Ranganatha, just like Perception the knowledge caused by the scriputes is ture. Further, by the performance of Yoga, He who ha attained very pure knowledge can see the truths of the Vedānta verily a direct Perception.”


            Ri Rangarajastava II.5.

            28. To those (materialits) who hold that inference and scripture could be subsumed under perception for the reason that at the time when there are no sense-organ there I no generation of knowledge through remembrance of (once-perceived) perceptions that become their cause, and also because all normal activitie o the senorium, Manas, are only instrumental in that direction and, therefore, depndent on the original perception that has come to us traditionally, (we reply) this view I not correct ince ht truth revealed by these (inference and tradition) authorities, are absolutely necessary even for themselves (in this argument).1

1The point is (i) the fact o remembrance or remembering itelf might be a fact of experience alone, yet to be able to ay that the past I lke the present or vice verse, is a fact of inference an not one of direct


            29. We have already stated that in th mantras etc., that get rid of poison, the method of agreement and difference (anvayavyatireki) I inapplicable. Even the ethical doctrine that holds the acquirement of wealth etc., as mean (to moksa) cannot aquiece in the means that are against dharma, in time other than that of danger, (i.e.  it might acquience in time of istres but not at other times). As regards the ‘Science of Thieving’ (steya-sastra), it says” Get money from those who are wicked and bestow it on thos who are good. Forcible plunder is not foul in that cae.” Likewise, as in the example of Śrī Tirumangai Alvar (Parakala), it is applicable to Ksatriya in th furtherance of righteouness (only).


            30. In the Science of Sex (Kama satra) which exist for the sake of pleasing one’ own wife it  is said” Without any violation of dharma, on hould seek love in the living beings, O Bharatarsabha.” Since it is helpful in the furtherance of innocent love, since it is prohibited from being used with respect to other women who have not seen at least five men, and since it ii intended to protect other women a alo one’s own women, it is declared that it is not opposed to dharma.


            31. That in all those matters which are not opposed to the world, there I no need to enter into controversy, is acceptable to all the schools. (But on the basis of this view), if it be pleaded that it (Lokayata) does not concern itself with thing beyond human experience, there can be no contradiction with this school on the basis of such (superhuman experience), then well might the Madhyamika nihilist who has given up everything, win in the argument.    

Perception. (ii) Tradition or scripture and dependence on it for knowledge reveal that o far from impugning tradition the carvākas accept it. (iii) Manas which I imperceptible is the instrument of activities of remembrance and recognitions and of retention.


            32. The claim that it is a system whose truth appeal to all is not true, since it is not in consonance with the views of intelligent men (nipuna Buddha). The Carvāka-theorist himself is afraid a to how to live if the imperceptible (world etc.,) were really existent. Further becaue the difference between , it would be wrong not to treat the sastric injunctions that are in accord with them as authoritative. It cannot be said that there are no well established differences between the classes which have come down through ages from (almost) beginningless time, without any kind of self contradiction.


            As said in the following passages “In the beginningless samsāra,” though in somethings there happen certain distractions, there are certain other things which do not get lost at all from beginning less time (i.e. they are permanent from the beginning) in the samsāra; after the complete annihilation of all, there I the creation established with all the four caste etc., there is  no less of varna etc. ‘whose fault is not in the caste? By disease who is not being troubled? By whom I misery not got? Whose happiness is eternal?” For these the meaning I that knowing these, one should remain without criticizing others.


            33. A kind of smell change the colour (or nature) of milk etc. (into other products such  butter, butter-milk, cream). By such sign revealed by perception, just like ghee, Indranila stone etc., class differences, brahminhood etc., caste-concept (jati) can be perceived. Thu have our ancient declared, (cf. Alavandar in Agamapramanya).


            “Tama is sudra, Rajas is ksatriya” a mentioned in thee (passages), if it be contented that jati (class-concept) is merely the comparative (excess of defect) differentiation (between the three qualities or the body), it must be said that the fact that what I unforgettably and universally  accepted a knowledge received from beginningless time, as in the case of the name of week day and their successive order1 is sufficient  answer. With the exception or man-class (manusyajati), if it be said that with regard to other classes of beings below it, there would b born mixed classes of being of the same kind a anuloma  and pratiloma issues, there I nothing repugnant in such reproductions of mixed classes, since, as in the case of individual belonging to horse-class, donkey-class, bull-class dog-class by copulation with other classes of being they do bring about mixed breeds such a mule etc.


            34. Though the Vaidic (orthodox) path prescribes many restriction on conduct, though they are very difficult to follow, since  they  have   been   handed

1 This I an entirely original argument adduced to prove the utter untenability of ht view that tradition is valueless and fictional. A fiction that has continued despite changes of date and founding of era, in so far a week day are followed all over wherever civilization exists, is a fiction no longer.


down from father to son in unbroken succession (continuity), it cannot be said that they have been created (by the unscrupulous) for the sake of misleading the live of the ignorant and the dull-witted and for the sake of deceiving the entire world. The kind o the prescribed by tradition (Sāmpradāya) owes its origin to beginninglss Veda without any break: to say that it makes one like a man who ha his left and right hands tied up, is not acceptable. (It is the way to liberation and not bondage that the Veda through self control governed by knowledge teaches, and not merely that it I a sastra that owes no allegiance to any human agency whatsoever).


            35. Nor is it correct to say that the body is the Self (atman).


“ Since there are parts, the outer organs that know the body as this also know the body. The Self that  has no parts that is to be known as the I is not capable of being known by the sense-organs, since it is self-luminous. The ordinary man seeing the close conjunction between the two (body and self does not know their distinct nature. Therefore O Ranganatha, the scriptures that deal about the transcendent world teach that which is different from the body.”


                        Śrī Rangarajastava, II.4.


            As mentioned in the above verse, since the body is:-


i.                    composite of limbs, hand and feet etc.

ii.                  since it is made up of  five elements,

iii.                it is known a my body different indeed from myself

iv.                 and is the object of sense-organ such as eyes etc., and since

   NOVEMBER, 2004  BETWEEy sensations when there is no contact with sense-organs, and  (as against the nature of the body) the atman is the knower having (continuous) oneness of form which enjoys throughout the body happiness (or misery which is incapable of being known by the outward sense-organ whilst capable of being known directly by one who practice samadhi (one-pointed concentration) when the sense-organs are withdrawn utterly (from outer objects), when one knows oneself to be different from the body, (the view, that the body I the atman gets refuted), and

vi.                 since like the flame (that has been re-lighted after having been extinguished) is recognized as having been extinguished) is recognized a identical with it previous flame, those judgments such as ‘fire burns’ which are inferences arising from dispensable antecedents could not be said to be similar-to perceptions that are antecedent and consequent relationships (between the self and its body), the view that the body is the atman gets refuted.


36. The example “The body of the stone-image” is inadmissible to prove  the view that ‘this I my body’. IN the judgment ‘My Self’, the atman (or self) refers to the nature of oneself (as a thinking  being); (therefore) the judgment “my house” cannot stand as an example of any (other) contrary meaning implied in the word ‘body’ (whose nature is quite different form the nature of the self jut as the house is).


37. The doctrine that by the combination of the four elements, like the arising of intoxicating power from the combination of ganja etc., consciousness arises, is refuted by  the counter-questions whether this consciousness arises out of each element individually or in their combination2. If it be  said that  (organs or)

1 The principle of esse est prcipi  is refuted here. The criticism I valid against all perceptual idealism such a has been made classical be Yogacaras, Madhyamika and Berkeley. Carvāka apparently also held the theory of perception which is identified with existence.

2Sarvarthasiddhi holds:- This is a dialectic (vikalpa); the answer must fall in one of this category. If it be said that  consciousness arises in each element, then  we should have innumerable number of consciousnesses  or selves within our body, as the body is composed of many parts. (A Leibnizean view results). If on the other hand this consciousness is said to be born through the  combination of all these parts or elements, after such a production, if the parts are separated once again, this quality of consciousness should be present in eac   NOVEMBER, 2004  BETWEEN


V. SHANTHA RAM, S/O. ŚRĪ V. VENKATESHWARLU aged about 36 years, occupae which is white and turmeric, which is yellow are mixed, we get a new


parts of the body severally are capable of cognizing, then the body would become a city, within which knowledge got by one (sense-organ) cannot be taken up by another (sense-organ), and there would (consequently) be no law of mutual help between the members.1


            39. Therefore the view held by Vaisesik and others, namely, that a new thing other than the part is born, mean only that the new thing I but a change of state of a causal material substance, which I accepted by all, and  not that it is something unlike anything determined by perception etc., which gets refuted on the strength of the principles of anyathasiddhi (that is essential antecedent in causation) and by recognition (that what occurs later is born out of the previous, however different its nature might be, as in the case of the change of mud into pot.)




            40. Even to those who accept the whole as produced, there is no reason for qualities not in the parts appearing in the self (the whole or the avayavin). Intoxicating power, poisoning  power, redness occurring when lime and turmeric are mixed, the hardness in the snow ball, the peculiar forms and tastes occurring in cooking etc., processes, these examples are testified to by perception.

colour and a new product, in which each portion has the new colour and new nature. Here Śrī Desika speak about new qualities emerging only in compounds, qualities which make the original substances different in every sense. The question that Desika asks is: Is the body a mixture  or a compound? – an important chemical question.


1 It would seem that Desika visualized the grama not s an organism but as a congregation of mutually unaffecting member wherein the knowledge of one need not coalesce with that of other. Individual freedom entails individual indifference to the rest of the  community.


42. If it be said that (consciousness) is only the combination of the part and that there is no such thing as self it would mean that there I merely the combination of whiteness and redness of the several part and not any other peculiar colour (which actually occurs when they re combined). For this reason, it would follow that the body is jut the putting together of hands and legs etc., limbs. (which I non-sense)


43. If it be said that (this combination of limbs etc.,) ha cognitive faculty then there would follow the fallacy of dialectical opposition (vikalpa) whether the self arise individually in each limb or in their combination? This mode of reasoning has been followed by the sages in the past:- -

“This body is distinguished by characteristic of manhood, head and limbs etc.”


            44. To those who hold that the body is the atman, and that ‘There I no other thing seen, nothing remembered when the body is abandoned, the tendencies do go off and nothing lasts after this” –the refutation of Udayana must be referred to.








            45. If it be said that there is no cause-effect relation at all, then their statement: “from them (elements) (arises) conciousness” cannot be true. The example that the thorn is sharp-pointed or curved would only illustrate that for each object there are peculiar causal condition, and not that it is an example of non-existence or any cause at all. There are cause suited to the special nature of the effects.





            (it should be remembered that it has been maintained by the materialist that it I due to their    NOVEMBthorns are sharp-pointed or curved etc.) For all effects that are existent or non-existent (bhavabhava), by taking into account only their peculiar nature (svabhava), if we hold that for each thing there must be a real cause, then as in the case of blueness and other qualities also, all should have (individual) cause. If we refer this causality to the nature of a thing (svabhava), then, it should be capable o producing all effects at all times. If, on the other has, it is due to conditions (such a qualities and situations), then, the question arises as to whether it I the nature of the quality (condition) or the quality or  the quality of that quality (condition) that produces the effects. Thus there would occur in the  former case, the fault of too-wide application, and in the latter case, of infinite regress (anavastha). Te cause-effect relation is thus self-contradictory and non-existent. Reasoning thus, they (Cārvākas) deny the very nature of the cause-effect relation. All such reasoning however, since they themselves lack reason, become illogical, since


(i)                 there thing that have both beginning and end should be either non-eternal r non-existent when they have no determination or cause for their origin or end:

(ii)               if between the individual particulars only there is said tot be cause effect relation, then there will happen the fault of inapplicability of this (relationship) to those other similar particular instance:

(iii)             if it be held that there is cause-effect relation regarding one particular thing, it would follow that it is according to what we see (perceive). (And therefore in all cases there I seen this cause-effect relation, and it is not chance that has demonstrated the particular cause-effect relation. Therefore cause-effect relation is universal).

(iv)              If the cause effect relation be not accepted, (1) there would occur contradictions to their own system which declares ‘from them arise consciousness’ etc., (2) contradiction to their premises, and (3) to their performing actions (on the basis of such acceptances, however limited, of the cause-effect relation.) And if they seek to refute other systems and establish their  own  view on the cause-effect relation.) And if they seek to refute other systems and establish their own system their own view on the cause-effect relation as non-existent, stands self-refuted.


46. As seen in the world, having agreed to follow such conduct as is suited for the sake of attaining those that are desirable and avoiding those that are undesirable, for the cārvākas to say that there I no cause-effect relation, means that there will be no place for reasoning (at all.) Between the production of conciousness, and the denial that there is any consciousness, there I self-contradiction. If it be contended that whilst the ingredients (samagri) which are said to give rise to consciousness remain without any light (prakasa), how can they produce any consciousness at all, in their product? (we reply) that us in case o dream and waking conciousnes knowledge arise at first without there being any determination of it cause, as can be discovered in our own recollections (smarana).


47. The doll’s talk, either through the powers of gods, or of asuras or of other souls through the pervasion of and through the will of the Lord who is the being indwelling and destining all actions whatsoever, are product of (some) conciousness which is their cause, since they are created at all places (and times). Also such examples as closing and opening of the lotus-bud, and expiration and inspiration of breath (are not autonomous machine-processes and as such) are refuted. The growth of the transplanted branch of a tree at any particular place (ksetra) occurs according to the individual karma-deserts of the countless souls (Ksetraj˝ā) who tenant these (trees). That there might be many more trees than other (living beings etc.) might be due to the large amount of sin that individual have committed (thus making them deserve to be born as plant rather than as men). This fact, however, cannot be a reason for the denial of the soul-body relationship. Thus the individual soul is proved to exist independent of the body, but as enjoying the deserts of it sinfulness and virtue, namely, misery and happiness. Thu the theories that teach that on the destruction of the body (no soul exists), and that the enjoyment of pleasure in the body is freedom, are refuted.


48. If it be said that if we accepted that there are such  fact, as vice and virtue, there will be multiplicity of reason in the instrument (ingredients) that severally are determined (i) for the sake of realizing those which have been desired and (ii) those which have been coming to us through heredity which are the special causes of our pain and pleasures, then we refute this view, since this is according to the views established according to the eternal Veda, in whose creation there are no contradictions which are capable of being mentioned. And there are no other faults.




            49. If it be said that in case we accept the principle of adrsta (invisible potencies) (or rather see the whole problem form that standpoint), when there are visible ingredient, there should not be invisible effect (to which they give rise), (then we reply) since such is seen to be the case in the lives of Prahlada and Hanuman and others belonging to their kind, as also in the case of curses etc., it is acceptable to us also.





            50. In perception, inference, ordinary information and scriptural knowledge, there happen in some sense the interrelation between word and meaning. How can there be any linking with meaning for words of the eternally existing Veda, like the words of a man who has dreamt, even though there is no fault at all in the individual? (i.e. without previous experience there call be no relationship between the words in their own nature there is a definite relation between the words and the meaning that arise out of them (more or less experienced or got through samskara). By these words definite knowledge is revealed by reference (pointing out to an object akanksa), connection (sandhi) and relevance (yogyata). When this relationship between word and meaning is not accepted, then there will be no production of any knowledge whatsoever, which have these word as causes. And to the knowledge that has thus arisen, since both the fault in the cause, and (later) in the source of knowledge which reveal that, are not existent there is no objection in accepting their validity as true a in the case of perceptive knowledge.


            51. Therefore, those schools which hold that in creation as well as in dissolution, there happen birth and death for the individuals, will be similar to the heterodox systems of Brahmadatta (Brhaspati). How can that soul which is said to merge into the Divine during Pralaya, everlasting, exist undestroyed during the daily and occasional creations and dissolutions? Therefore the souls will be eternally established in moksa in Oneness (identity). But since the scriptural text which teach difference between souls will contradict the state of moksa decribed by this view, since equality in the possession of attributes and similarity will not accure, since to the liberated soul free enjoyment etc, activities are attributed, what is meant by everlasting deluge I destruction of ignorance, karma  etc., and non-return to birth and the complete  Brahman-experience (and not as Advaita holds, loss of individual uniquenesses). Therefore the doctrine which uphold that Moksa mean annihilation of self is equivalent to the Cārvāka doctrine.


            52. The view, which, on the basis of momentariness of all things, refutes the difference between quality and substance, also seeks to refute the doctrine of qualified eternal atman. Refutation of this view must be sought in the chapter where we deal with Buddhist doctrines.


            53. Therefore, having known the eternal Self which is well-known through perception, inference and scripture, one should seek to attain that which will banish sorrow and happiness that belong to the world of the ordinary materialist,


            54. Prajapati and Brhaspati, the teacher of the gods, when they taught the identity between the soul and body,  it was for the purpose of deluding the Asuras. Jabali’s words which owe their origination to the devotion to Śrī Rama are answered by Śrī Rama’s own words.


            55. In the description of Asramas, to say that the Lokayatas are the foremost (violators) is to say that the Lokayata system is fit to be criticized (given up). Therefore it has absolutely no relationship with Veda or Vedic thought (which they glibly quote). That  which is fit for those who are like animals deeply tainted by sin, cannot become the means to truth.


            56. Like those, who knowing that they would get fruits by bring devoted to their worldly masters (kings etc.), act on such knowledge in the world, it is certainly no fault if one asserts that by devotion to the All Highest Lord proved by the world, scripture, and common experience one could gain fruits. Even to those who are devoted to Perception alone, there is no possibility of refuting this because the nature of the Veda and the knowledge born out of such knowledge of Veda are also facts of perception. For this (Veda), the faults due to genesis (cause) or illuding knowledge (limiting adjuncts, upadhi) are absent, and as such there is no possibility o refuting it.