The
most significant feature of this
school (dar’sana) is that it holds
that sensory and inferential
knowledge are mediated knowledge and
as such not the absolute knowledge.
The first is mediated by senses and
it is so very individuated from one
soul (jiva) to another and also it
differs from several points – or
points of view. In other words, it
is clear that every proposition
about sense-knowledge is strictly
conditioned by factors of space,
time, point of view, nature of the
sense organs and the action.
Similarly inference which is
sense-dependent is conditioned not
only by sense but also by the laws
of inference – the principles of
relational thought – the most
important being the law of
contradiction and the law of
excluded middle which are absolute
in so far as one cannot affirm the
truth of two contradictories or
their co-existence at the same
time. The reality that we meet with
is incapable of being squeezed into
the patterns of anumana, inferential
reason, since it is clear that
almost all facts of reality present
the reality of contradictory
standpoints and the impossibility of
dichotomy as such, for every
dichotomy struggles to get rid of it
by a dialectic of opposites so to
speak resulting in a synthesis of
opposites.
The Ultimate knowledge
is available to unmediated
consciousness that is the natural
condition of the soul in freedom –
that is freedom from all karmic
bodies and conditions. Karma
produces the body which limits the
knowing function or the
consciousness which is the essence
of the jiva. In its purest
conditioned or of unlimited being,
the soul is not only omniscient but
also omnipervasive. The limitations
of karma reduce the size of the soul
(or soul’s consciousness since the
two are inseparable) to the size of
its body of karma; this might be
from that of a bacterial cell or
gnat to that of Brahma, from the
infinitismal to the infinite. One
is as big as one’s body in this
sense that it is thus far alone that
we discern its action or activity. or activity. or activity.
Activity thus limits the
body of the soul, and produces these
limits so to speak. The theory of
interconvertibility of energy into
matter (karma into pudgala) in fact
reveals the basic form of the
soul-body nature. In fact if the
soul desists from action then there
is the reconversion of the matter
into energy and liberation may
proceed till all energy is further
converted into consciousness. This
last step of course was not taken as
Jaina limited himself to
reconversion of all matter into
energy which he did through tapas
(austerity), which further he threw
out of the soul ultimately.
Perfect knowledge
(Samyaqdar’sana) that is true in an
absolute sense is available to those
who have reached this stage of
freedom from all limitations of body
and action. This is direct
consciousness accomplishing the
truth for the self. What all souls
who have attained this state have is
the absolute knowledge – it is the
knowledge of the Arhats or Jinas.
This is comparable to the
Saccidananda of the Veda. We may
call it integral or wholly
unconditioned knowledge – knowing
which one may be said to know All.
In any case Jainas refused to accept
mere scriptural knowledge as true
for they have seen that this
knowledge through scripture is
mediated even then. Direct
Awareness of Truth or Reality which
is purely unconditionedly spiritual
alone is Absolute knowledge. The
Veda falls below it, Veda would
demand yet a verification by direct
attainment. Therefore hearing the
Veda settles nothing and there are
several versions too and we have yet
to get a mimamsa to decide as
between the texts as to which is
true or how to make them
non-contradictory.
Brahmanubhava like
Kevalanubhava is beyond the
scripture. We can see that even Sri
Krsna makes the reference to a
knowledge or attainment beyond the
Veda – traigunya visaya Veda,
nistraigunay bhava …..
Thus of the three kinds
of knowledge, Saksatkara or
unmediated and unconditioned
Omniscience and omnipervasiveness is
absolute knowledge – available to
the Arhats and the Jinas. Every
soul can attain this condition
through strenuous practice of the
tapas comprising the triratna.
The other two are
mediated and conditioned knowledge.
They are relatively true. Knowing
gives truth but every truth can
become only partially true or even
become false (which is truth in a
sense but distorted by conditions).
Thus sensory knowledge is in this
great relativistic private
predicament. Inference has been
claimed to get rid of privateness
and relativity, in so far as it
bases its inference on observed
uniformities and invariable
concomitances. But these are again
sense-dependent. Undoubtedly we
have greater freedom in inference.
But for getting at certainty of
knowledge or validity we have no
secure principles. The abstract
axioms of both induction and
deduction do not apply to concrete
situations. In fact we find that
contradictory positions are being
taken in life as well. In fact the
pluralistic and individualistic
conception sees that there are
several points of view and each
point of view may be right from that
point of view but wrong from
another. The contradictions then
between points of view cannot be
resolved because they are
co-existing contradictions which,
however, do not seem to cancel one
another.
The dialectical logic
has always realized that two
contradictory propositions co-exist
in polar opposition. In reality too
the contradictories co-exist in
tension, and one is understood in
terms of the other alone. The
importance of the category of
negation, even like non-existence
(abhava), has been fully realized
but inferential logic arbitrarily
selected to forego this truth by
affirming the law of contradiction
and the law of excluded middle. The
reason ultimately lies in practical
utility or action which was
considered to be a kind of puglism
or struggle or pulling away from
each other as in a tug-of-war.
Unfortunately debates also have
taken the shape of controversy or
opposition. The advantages of
opposition, even in politics, is not
be minimized. We see more clearly
the faults of others than of
ourselves. There is thus a
cancellation of faults and an
attempt on both sides to rid of
faults so that a real lasting
agreement would be possible.
Unanimity would result not by
compromise but by a deliberate
attempt to consider the faults
exposed by others, not to resent
them at all. This may be healthy
battle in order to arrive at truth.
But truth must be the goal –a truth
that is inferentially possible by
taking into consideration all the
apparently or really contradictory
points of view. This is the
principle of other consideration, to
see ourselves as other’s see us. It
is most helpful both in logical
striving for whole truth or even a
synthesis of truths. A true
coherent system is a different
conception from that put forward by
the idealists who afraid to declare
that two contradictory propositions
both of them particular (but
mistaken for universal) can be
true. The real trouble is that
where there are only particular
propositions with varying degrees of
generality there cannot be real
contradiction or contrariety.
Technically stated in terms of the
formal logic, 1 (One) and 0 (Zero)
propositions can both be true. And
no one has a right to treat I and O
propositions as universal
proposition. Jaina logic thus once
for all dismisses the claim that in
respect of conditional knowledge
propositions can be absolute or
universal. Thus we can have
propositions of varying degrees of
contradiction – all of them true but
partially or conditionally but
nonetheless true within those
limits.
A new type of logic thus
is proposed – this is the logic of
Sevenfold prediction – Saptabhangi
dependent upon or independent of
sevenfold leads (nayas) points of
view.
Thus from one point of
view a thing is (asti) and from
another point of view that thing is
not (naasti). Combing both these
points of view one could say that a
thing is and is not (astinastica).
But a fourth point of view could
discern that since the ‘is’ of the
thing and the ‘is-not’ of the thing
are not capable of being put in
juxtaposition since there is change,
the logical language of conjunction
could not be adopted. It is
something that can only be said to
be inexpressible (avaktavyam). But
since it is it is inexpressible; and
since it is not and is inexpressible
it is not and inexpressible and
lastly it is and it is not and
inexpressible. There are said to be
the seven ways of predicating being
and non-being of any experience or
thing. Since all the propositions
are in a sense particular and
conditional the Jaina logicians
propose the indefinite ‘Syat’ (May
be) to be prelixed to all
propositions thereby revealing not
only the tentative nature of the
truth of the propositions but also
the particularity of these
propositions.
It is true that this
logic is criticized on the basis of
its not having definite alternatives
logically sound and refutable. It
is even said to be a kind of logical
dance or shirting of positions and
in fact it may be said that this
does not follow the usual pattern of
nyaya. It is the emphasis on Naya
not Nyaya that Jaina logic makes. A
nyaya must lead to a naya towards
reality but cannot condition reality
and affirm that reality must conform
to our standards rather than that we
should shape our standards or
instruments to know reality. It is
true some are satisfied with the
logic of the finite mind or
conditioned practical mind for
different reasons. Some
(revelationists) wan to prove that
logic (anumana) cannot give us
reality and therefore to discredit
it is good for apologetics of
revelation. Others do not see that
need to arrive at a unitary or
higher synthetic vision through
mutual understanding and laborious
piecemealing, for struggle is a
solution – dialectical victory is
light and gives us enormous sense of
joy.
A peaceful people with a
philosophy of peace could hardly go
to war, even of words, for they see
clearly that there can be different
facets to truth – and the range may
be very vast. As it is said that
there must be Harmony and there must
be sufficient truth behind all
utterances and experiences from the
gnat to the Brahma and all together
are indeed capable of being
comprehended in a single Vision
ultimately.
If discussion is a
peaceful solution to conflicts and
the goal is integral understanding
on the plane of human experiences of
truth, then the seven point logic
seems to pave the way towards
arriving at the synthesis of truth –
not of course the Ultimate Vision.
Truth would then correspond with
Vision, the idea would coalesce with
Reality. But that is a long way off
so long as we swear by the
absoluteness of the laws of
thought. The logic of the finite
mind (conditioned reason) is verify
committing suicide when it tries to
set up absolute standards. A
natural route to transcendence of
reason is to accept to give up or
renounce the so-called laws of
thought and seek a new methodology
towards integral vision – a way by
which we accept that contradictory
propositions could both be true, and
then go forward towards constructing
a total idea of any object of
knowledge so as to include the
manifold nature of predicates in
union. In fact this really reveals
that every fact can have
multiplicity of qualities
(predicates) but we claim that these
dualities should not be
contradictory. This mental
reservation should also be
abandoned, for Reality is more than
mind and unless the mind frees
itself of these habits (material
crutches), it cannot realise the
Vision.
It is not of course the
intention of the Jainas to make
Saptabhangi a substitute – though
near substitute of vision (direct
unmediated omniscient and
omnipervasive Vision). But in a
world of such manifold predications,
no one should claim absolute truth
except the Arhat or the Free Soul.
Jaina logic is a
corrective to the theories of three
or four kotis (kinds of predication)
practised by the Buddhists and later
by the Advaita Vedanta and other
logicians.
II
The attempt to
understand the nature of a thing as
it in itself or for itself of course
very difficult. Firstly when the
most important fact about oneself is
asked by the question ‘Who am I?’
one is perplexed and cannot answer
by the tautology ‘I am I’ or what is
uttered by that sacred formula ‘I am
that I am’. For it is not so simple
after all to repeat the formula of
identity. If this were to be the
case with oneself, it is thought
however that we can be able to speak
of another or an object more
satisfactorily. This too of course
is not possible. Every thing is
related to something else either by
location or time or sequence or
logically by negation and so on.
All experiential terms are
corrective terms – in Indian logical
terminology they are either anuyogi
or pratiyogi, positive correlates or
negative or counter correlates.
Thought much of our life
is lived in terms of these yet the
close and coherent experience of men
does not follow this dualistic or
dialectical mode of operations.
Useful in a sense, it is found to be
not only incapable of helping
integrative thinking but positively
hindering integrative approach.
Accustomed by the habit of mind to
think in terms of conflict and
division or dividedness, one does
not perceive that all these
conflicts etc occur within a whole
and have meaning in terms of the
whole in which they seem to have
meaning in terms of their opposites
or counter correlates. Indeed so
significant was this discovery that
it has been assumed that all
division or even possible division
is of the nature of opposition and
demanding a dialectical process of
mutual conflict and assimilation,
socalled synthesis. All are in the
triadic movement of these, anti
thesis and synthesis.
This implicative logic
is an implication of negations.
Truly there is also another type of
logical that reveals implication by
relational conjunction of
affirmatives. This Croce called the
dialectic of distincts, in so far as
there is the movement of thought (of
event) towards its fullness and
having the terms not in type of
thesis-anti-thesis and synthesis but
thesis-higher-thesis and integrative
thesis or synthesis. This is
organic unification not of opposites
but of correlatives. Though the
play of opposites has been the
pattern for logical understanding
and the fruitfulness of negation and
counter – negation has been
enormous, this play of negations or
opposites even though leading to
synthesis seems to delight in
renewing the struggle by further
counterthesis and further theses and
synthesis. This may be described as
evolution logical, and may even be
claimed to be true of the material
evolution as well, though it is just
possible that biological evolution
would not accept this as the
characteristic shape or nature of
biological evolution as such except
at certain levels.
There seem to be two
types of dialectic movement as Croce
pointed out and not one and only one
form of dialectic. The Jaina theory
of many points as expounded by their
logicians themselves does not
explain how knowledge grows and
leads to the total knowledge from
the consideration of aspects or
leads (nayas). Their explanation
shows only that each and every thing
can be known from several points of
view (reduced to the minimum of
seven, or maximum of seven according
to others). Even here the problem
was reduced to the predicate of mere
‘being’ (asti). Each one of the
propositions was also reduced to the
status of a particular one, since
the introduction of may be includes
only a part of the denotation (or
connotation if connotatively viewed)
of the subject and not the whole of
the subject. This reduces even
being to cover only a part of the
subject. This is called the
particular proposition. What is
true of a part need not be true of
the whole or other parts. Thus
homogeneity of the object is not
accepted even in respect of being.
Similarly in respect of the other
predicates.
Thus if a things is said
to be (syad asti), it is in respect
of that part that has been
perceived. Suppose it is
interpreted that for another person
it is a ‘not-is’, then we are bound
to be worried about the meaning of
the term ‘is’ whether it, is meant
in the same sense as the first. But
it can be claimed that ‘is’ is not
permanent but very transitory, so
much so, before one assets that a
thing is it would have become not is
or passed away. This is the claim
of the doctrine of memomentariness
of all created things or the nature
of life itself (as per Buddhism,
Heraclitus etc.). Combining the two
assertions it follows that one can
say that a thing is and is not but
this too is a probable (may be).
The very nature of linking up the
two opposites for the sake of a
comprehensiveness or synthesis of
predictions, leads us to a
difficulty about describing the
nature of a reality that is of this
illogical nature, that is to say a
reality that cannot be put up in
frames of logical language or any
language technique. But it is
nevertheless an is, an is – not and
is and isnot. By a series of
combinations of the first four the
three others are said to be possible
ways of predication.
The question would be;
are these further three predictions
just theoretical possibilities or
real predications from experience?
That which is unspeakable
(Avaktavya) is and therefore it is
acceptable, say the Philosophers of
the Absolute. That it is not is the
view of those who are absolute
Nihilists for the whole question of
being in the ordinary sense of the
term is inapplicable to that
condition. But the third
alternative yet holds that the
predicates can be combined again at
this higher level of the Absolute.
These appear to be just theoretical
assumptions, and incapable of
justification. For it is one thing
to say that being is the predicate
and there can be other predicates
than being (existence) and a
composite theory of predication will
have to be taken into consideration.
The necessity for
accommodating several points of view
is a logical necessity that is to
say, it is a demand of thought to
arrive at unified picture of a
thing, of any thing. It is perhaps
even true to say that it is a
necessity of reality itself which
has all the potentialities of
plurality. Thus the One Reality has
been stated to be described
variously – Ekam Sat, viprah bahudha
vadanti. The description or
predication of this One is various
ways seems to have been a necessity
that is ontological. The question
is whether the ontological implies
the logical and that means
ultimately we shall be able to
arrive through logical at the
ontological, and the two are not
contradictory at all. However, we
have the important question as to
which logic is ontologically useful
and which is contrary to the
ontological. That today we have
several logicians who deny ontology
and are interested in developing a
non-ontological logic shows that
there is no one logic – indeed the
very laws of thought once claimed to
be sacrosanct are no longer
occupying that place. There are
thus logics of the sciences
(physics, chemistry and mechanics),
the logic of the organic (biology)
the logic of society or social
dynamics, the evolutionary logic and
so on. The need for the logic of
the infinite or the Supermind has
been deeply felt by those who found
that the kind of thought operating
in the different spheres is
different and moulded to the pattern
of the object. The relativity of
thought is such that it cannot claim
even that absoluteness of velocity
of light postulated by physics. The
illusion that there is one and only
one kind of thought operating at
different levels or areas of human
activity or in matter-motion,
organic activity and organic
evolution or spiritual activity and
social dynamics has been the cause
of the various difficulties raised
about the logical, rational and the
irrational and so on. Just as the
consciousness operating in the human
system in different sectors of it
such as the muscular, circulatory,
nervous and glandular etc., is
different and gets the name of
unconscious, conscious and
sub-conscious, even so we are forced
to acknowledge that thought works
with different set of axioms so to
speak in different areas of
existence. These may not be
contradictory though apparent
contradictions may prevail, they
cooperate in keeping up the unity of
the system (organism).
The interpretation of
the integrative logic or multi
predicational logic of the Jaina
should be constructively shown. At
lest a reconstruction of that logic
has better promise than any other
logic.
Assuming that there are
several predicates for a thing the
question is how they co-exist and
can co-exist. If the predicates are
of different kinds they can
co-exist. Eg. Redness, softness,
movement, having a name, location in
space and time can all co-exist.
Similarly a man can be intelligent,
fair, brave and jolly. Thus the
Ultimate Reality has been stated to
be Truth, Consciousness-knowledge
and Infinite (Satyam, jnanam,
anantam Brahma). These predicts
co-exist without canceling others.
Possibly their opposites cannot
co-exist. The attempt to reduce all
to one predicate either by making
them synonymous or canceling them
has been attempted but
unsuccessfully, for we have yet to
answer the question why then so many
predicates? – are they meaningless?
The only plausible theory would be
to recognize that there are
compatible and compossible
predicates and non-compossible
predicates. Further what appear to
be incompatible and uncompossible
predicates may turn out to be
compossible or vice versa.
The multi-predicational
theory then would have to show how
the seven standpoints are
compossible for a total view albeit
external. (Of course one could
combine the internval view if the
object studied also has a capacity
for internal viewing as in the case
of human beings). But there is
hardly much evidence of this.
Jainas state seven
standpoints or leads (nayas):
1.
Naigama (nigama) – the theory of
abstract conceptions apart from one
another is a fallacy.
2.
Samgraha naya is the point of view
of the common aspects of objects.
To regard only the generic (or
common) aspects without taking into
consideration other aspects leads to
a fallacy. The particular and the
generic are inseparable or to use
the language of Nyaya; samvatya;
inherent.
3.
Vyavahara naya: the practical
considerations may alone be taken –
its use alone omitting other factors
leads to the fallacy of practical
interest blinding us to other facts.
4.
Rijusutra naya – the standpoint of
the present moment – the specious
present omitting the antecedents or
history leads to a kind of
abstraction – that can lead to false
knowledge. But it should also not
be forgotten that the present is as
important as per the past or the
future etc.
5.
S’abada naya is said to be the
literal point of view from that mere
grammar or nature of the Sound or
World. There can be two types of
error arising from the rudhi or
common use of words as well as those
arising from mere yoga (etymology).
Etymological use is most times ruled
out by common usage (rudhi), but
etymology rescues rudhi from
becoming merely conventional. But
both must be taken note of and in
technical works the etymological has
more aptness whereas in common
language and literature the rudhi
has more aptness. One can be easily
led into mistakes when these are not
understood.
6.
The
sambhairudhha naya is the technical
etymological use of words and as
already pointed out unless one has
been told that the words used are
all etymological and not
conventional one is in difficulty.
But the usage in certain literature
such as mantra-sastra or science
restricts itself to them not only
because such usage is meaningful and
helpful in coining terms (as it has
been done with reference to Greek
and Latin languages in the West and
Sanskrit in early times in India)
but prevents those who have no such
knowledge and training from using
this knowledge. In this sense
occult languages have developed
mostly etymological language
requiring nirkta, etymological
dictionaries.
However, the approach in
respect of language or propositions
is technical and cannot be
generalized even as the former naya
or lead can be generalized.
The theory that there is
no etymological significance in
rudhi and that rudhi has developed
interpedently of etymology is
questionable. Rudhi develops out of
emphasizing other aspects of an
object than the original
etymological (yoga) which are found
to go together. For eg. Crow is a
word that has come out of an
nomotopeac significance or from kr.
But it has later on signified either
any black thing or since a crow
always accompanies another vulture
etc., it has begun signify a toady
or flatterer for self-gain. The
word S’veta white, has begin to
signify purity, this transference of
other attributes is a basis of rudhi
– divergence from etymology. This
of course assumes the co-existence
of multiple predicates, which leads
to the mistaken leads of rudhi –
divergence from etymology. This of
course assumes the co-existence of
multiple predicates, which leads to
the mistaken leads in rudhi, much
more than the etymological which
tries to dientangle the confusions
of the rudhi, philosophy always
attempts to restore the yoga or
etymology as can be seen in the
writings of Alfred North Whitehead
and in literature of Carlyle and
others. The use of philosophy is to
maintain an active novelty of
fundamental ideas illuminating the
social system …. The purpose of
philosophy is to rationalize …. Not
to explaining it away but by
introduction of novel verbal
characteristics rationally
coordinated Says A.N. Whitehead
speaking about mysticism. It is no
less imperative to realise that
philosophy is a technical job not
that of a mere poet of the common
man or merely guided by rhythmatic
spells.
7.
The
last naya or lead is Evambuta naya;
it is the point of view of the
actual function the object performs.
There are some of the
most important and there can be many
more. As it was pointed out,
mathematically considered, Leibniz
did postulate an infinity of
standpoints or perspectives of
reality and whilst ideally
considering that of them can be
clear and distinct also held the
view that there are not merely
infinite number of perspectives
there are also gradations of clarity
and distinctness, of consciousness
too. How all these are to be beheld
as a whole as parts of a stupendous
whole or how they are all reflected
in one single part also is the
mystery of Whole-part relationship
that is beyond all verbal expression
(avaktavya).
However, the philosopher
must make the effort and has been
doing it. Jaina (and the
Leibnizian) have been striving to
make a reality of the axioms
(postulates) of Sufficient Reason
and Harmony of the Whole. These two
of course could be clear only to one
who has not only comprehended the
reality and rationality of multiple
non-contradictory points of view
(which taken separately would lead
to grievous fallacies), but also who
has been brought to the point of
insight of unity of vision that
illuminates the whole and the
reality of the comprehension or
transforms the very nature of the
unity into a dynamic fact of
Super-Being. One transcends thought
through Vision, but such a vision is
significant to the thought and it is
thought that gains in the process,
not as in the case of lower vision,
vision that gins through thought.
This is the meaning behind the term
sphota – illumination breaking up
the doubts about terms and thoughts
and their relationship – an original
Vision that combines with Sound and
illumines all the thoughts below and
all the experiences in a single
flash of self-evidence and
existence.
It is in Vision,
samyagdars’ana, that one finds the
significant Union – the eternal
oneness in eternal manyness, and an
eternal manyness realizing their
inward reality and unity in the
clarity of light or lighting of the
One. It not only gives the external
unity of predicates but the internal
(for itself) nature of it as
illuminating from eternity their
unity in itself – unconsciously,
subconsciously and consciously now
superconsciously. A comprehensive
logic is a necessity. That it
should exceed the logic of the
finite mind wedded to the principles
of abstract identity and abstract
contradiction and opposition and
excluded middle is very clear.
Indeed it was one of the aims of a
transcendent logic even of the
nihilistic variety to take the
middle road or path or the golden
mean. Sri Aurobindo tries to
explain how the logic of the
supermind mediates between the logic
of the Infinite and the logic of
dichotomy and disjunction.
In the Life Divine he
shows how the logic of the Infinite
is beyond our comprehension. It is
in so far as it is All that is that
it can be understand in terms of
what we know or experience. It is
because of the immanency of the
infinite One that we are enabled to
apprehend it at all. This immanency
is already presented to usin thform
of oneness of the manyness – both
need each other and support each
other and are meaningful in this
togetherness that is also
inseparability. The dual poise of
the Ultimate are creative of delight
in conflict but in union, and this
without any abridgement or
limitation of the powers of both.
It is clear also that nothing that
is not inherent in the One-many can
ever come into any kind of being.
Matter, life ad mind in their subtle
forms are already inherent in this
higher poise and level, and are
exhibited in the evolution or
descent.
The expression of
plurality takes place in these
levels of matter, life and mind, and
in each it is differentiated and
divided in a way, though in truth
there can hardly be any
dividedness. The multiplicity
develops its own logical of
relationships – of all kinds. The
absorption of each one of the many
in their own individual separateness
leads to the emergency of a new
factor of ignorance (avidya) which
is a product of the power of
manyness in the One. This conceals
or veils the unity. Thus the
logical development of avidya,
however, is not due to any original
(anadi) beginningless factor
external to the supreme one but
something that originates in the (i)
manifestation of the many (ii) in
the extension of the One as space
and time, (iii) in the absorption of
the many in their individual
manyness as such in extension of
time and space, and (iv) in their
inherent struggle to unite or
reunite in and through each other to
arrive at the one, which is the
unconscious foundation of each one
of the many – a reunion arrived at
through conflict, struggle, sorrow
and so on.
To the question then
whether ignorance has its locus in
Brahman, in reply it can be said
that it is not so much the ignorance
but the manyness that is inherent in
Brahman. Ignorance is a product of
the play of manyness in their
manyness rather than in their
oneness which undoubtedly is
substanding all the many both in
their manyness and in their play of
manyness. Ignorance is not unreal,
it is the law of the play of
manyness qua manyness even as
knowledge is the play of manyness in
Oneness qua oneness.
There is in Sri
Aurobindo’s conception the need for
several kinds of logic. But all of
them are governed by the conception
of a logic of Oneness that comprises
the manyness and of the standpoints
of the many, called the poises of
the many. A relativistic logic is
not a final logic but an
intermediary logic, which has to be
transcended. Since the finite is
included in the Infinite, this could
be both quantitative (space-time
extension) and qualitative
(intensive).
There has been much
speculation whether Sri Aurobindo’s
conception of Reality is Advaita or
Bhedabheda or Visistadvaita. Both
Bhedabheda and Visistadvaita are
forms of advait but they include
difference rather than reject it.
The difference is in the former a
conditional production cuffing
manifestation, and though real is
not ultimate. In so far as it is a
condition it follows that this must
have a locus – is it in Brahman or
the One or is it extraneous to the
One? If the latter it is not
advaita. It is in a sense similar
to the illusionistic Monism, which
provides for a dualism of Brahman
and Maya. This is a dualism of
Avidya and Brahman. Therefore the
Bhedabheda even when it recognizes
the possibility of a reality within
which both difference (bheda) and
identity or oneness (abheda) can and
do co-exist, and thus transcends the
opposition (duality) between them,
yet gives not merely a subordinate
position to difference, but rejects
it ultimately, for it is suspicious
of the ultimacy of difference
itself. There is obviously a doubt
whether the conjunction of an
omnipotent Identity and impotent
difference could be a permanent
arrangement. It seems to be
axiomatic amongst earlier Vedantins
that advaita or Onenes (Ekatva) is
the fact about Reality not
difference – and all difference can
only be a subordinate truth or
reality. Bhedabheda in so far as it
recognizes both the fact of identity
and difference to be true to this
axiom of reality and the axiom of
experience.
It must be said that Sri
Ramjuna attempted a spiritual as
well as organic analogy of the
relationship between the One and the
many. The concrete picture of an
Organism reveals the oneness and the
manyness in significant unity. As
it was shown the concrete oneness is
unity not identity and it is the
synthesis of many giving the
appearance of oneness. The parts of
the whole are in significant unity
and bear the name of one, the
structure and shape being given one
name. Thus in Buddhist thought the
aggregation of many parts (skandha)
or the (avayavi) of Vaiseshika is a
new thing – it is a unity of
manifold parts of the most divergent
nature. We refer to the unity as
one and the name is one for the
whole of parts. But this unity of
the organism or the whole is
precarious and subject to death and
disease and disintegration or
analysis. Thus the analogy of the
organism was refuted. The organic
conception, however, need not be
entirely based on this perishable
unity. In fact in so far as the
organic unity of the subtle bodies
(linga sarira) was concerned all the
schools agree that it is long
lasting – because it persists
through several births and deaths
till the final attainment when it
breaks up into its parts and the
soul is released. This leads to the
view that the unity is not
maintained only by the desire or
ignorance but also by the soul
(purusa). If so, a more potent soul
or purusa could sustain the unity
even when the desire has exhausted
itself or the ignorance has been
liquidated by knowledge. The idea
of God or Isvara is such a power of
Unity which maintains the organism
of many parts and can do so either
eternally or temporarily. Thus
Isvara as the Self or principle of
oneness can maintain the unity of
the organism – whether material or
spiritual or a combination of both
as it is in evolution. Rightly it
was argued by Sri Aurobindo this
material organism could be
maintained eternally by God or
God-consciousness-Force and rendered
immortal. Sri Ramanuja held that
this could be seen in respect of the
immortal unchanging matter
(nitya-vibhuti) when the souls might
get the immortal body. There seems
to be nothing preventing the
immortalizing of the body even of
this matter through it must be held
that if the law of this matter is
change, the slow substitution of the
other type of matter (unchanging
matter) can be done even in this
organism. This may be a principle
of transformation or transmission or
alchemical change which is possible
perhaps to God or God –
consciousness.
In any case the logic of
this procedure is that the Ultimate
Unity is possible through the
Oneness – Consciousness which is
maintaining the unity or integrality
of the manyness which as it were
form its body, so to speak. A body
is organically defined as a unity of
parts maintained by a consciousness
or soul. The wholeness
characterized, is maintained by that
consciousness, and the whole has its
own functions and properties which
are not always present in each one
of the parts or systems within the
whole. Thus manyness and the
oneness are compatible in reality,
and it is not a precarious unity –
though that is the reflection
arising from the experience of the
organisms as we know them. A
perfectly adapted organism so to
speak might not be in need of a
periodic disintegration and
integration for survival as it is in
the case of imperfect organisms in
evolution. This is the truth behind
the concepts of S’arlra and
nitya-s’arlra in Ramnuja’s
philosophy. A body is defined thus
spiritually so as to include the
temporal body. It is that which a
conscient souls supports, controls,
and enjoys for its own sake and
which is dependent on that soul
alone or exclusively. This is true
he holds both of the souls (which
are themselves conscient) and the
nature (which is acit inconscient).
They therefore form the body of
God. The finite many and the
inconscient nature are inseparably
indivisibly related to the Supreme
God or the Sarva S’ariri
(All-Soul). This is the Oneness in
manyness. The description of this
relationship is called
S’arlra-s’ariri sambandha coupled
with s’esa-s’esi-bhava (dependence
relation on the independent). The
two poises of the Infinite Divine
Being are mentioned as the subtle
(causal) and the gross (effectual)
and in both conditions, and indeed
both conditions, are willed by the
Divine Self. Thus the cause
contains the effect and the effect
returns also to the cause – the
analogy is perhaps the
seed-tree-seed relationship, of
cause effect cycle. The suksma
cid-acid-visista Brahman becomes the
sthula suksma cid-acid-vis’ista
Brahman and returns to the
suksma-condition after the lila of
the Divine is played out. Thus
Ramanuja’s philosophy has been
described as Vis’istavadvaita – or
fully expressed it is
cid-acid-vis’istadvaita. It is not
to be translated as qualified monism
– which would correct if it is a
mechanical description of parts and
whole; it is an organic description
that has been stated and a dynamic
functional relationship reveals the
eternity of this continuing Oneness
as Self. The Aurobindonian concept
of evolution as the dynamic
threading up of the several planes
and poises of the Infinite One in
the infinte manyness has the nature
of the organic. Evolution is
organic or it is not evolution at
all. The oneness is the stem of the
organic whole and supports its
manifold parts or organs, or amsas
or rays of energy and light so on,
both o the temporal nature and the
eternal undiminishing nature.
Neither of the poises of the Divine
is more absolute, neither
dispensable. Thus it includes all
points of view and being and yet
maintains the Oneness throughout by
its transcendence over all dualities
and extremes.
So when attempts are
made to analyse the Aurobindonian
view as a kind of bhedabheda (either
of the Bhaskara or Yadava Prakasa or
any other) one finds that it does
not fall into the pattern of
mechanistic or conditional monism or
identity and difference. Nor does
it conform to the Bosanquetean
formula of Identity in difference.
That one feels the traces of such
idealism in their works is clear but
Aurobindonian idealism because of
its emphasis on the Evolution and
the Organic integration seems to be
different from all earlier schools
of Vedanta. In his system evolution
and involution are not just
descending processes and ascending
processes comparable to the pravrtti
and nivrtti; they are integrative
processes.
The problem of logical
naming of this kind of idealism is
therefore not simple. It is
necessary to conceive of the whole
or Reality as it is in itself as
maintaining in unity both its
Oneness and its manyness – a feature
recurrent in every type of
manifestation or projection – with
the supreme possibility of
alternating dominance of the Oneness
or the manyness – with the other
possibility of oneness engaging
itself with the manyness in the One,
or the engagement of the manyness
with the one in their manyness and
manyness with manyness without
reference to the One. All these
give point to levels of being and
each of them is real and true and
capable of reproducing and implying
sac-cid – ananda. As Sri Aurobindo
points out this very saccidananda
(three supernals) is reflected in
the temporal extension. As
sattva-rajas-tamas trinity in all
their diversity in manyness. All
these plays are lila and therefore
we have many kinds of lila or play
which implies the unity in diversity
and diversity in unity (prati-lila).
Thus the inevitability
of the reproductive participation of
the Ultimate in each one of the many
both as one and many and as all is
the kind of necessity in the very
nature of the reality. That this
kind of reproduction and
participation leads to the logic of
correspondence as also the mystic
logic of all in each and each in all
or expressed in another way as in
the macrocosm so in the microcosm
would also be clear. Further this
has no recourse to the logic of the
finite and the divided but it can
reveal that that logic is the law of
exclusion of the unity through
rejection of the same through not
excluding it wholly in so far as it
aims at a system of onesided
truths. It is within the realm of
ignorance that it operates. It
considers itself to be sovereign
within that realm. But it is forced
to firm limits to its realm of
understanding.
Thought as determined by
ignorance expires in the Infinite,
out when thought determines the
ignorance it is not found that it
has to expire at all. It becomes
ridher and profounder and modifies
the operations of the ignorance and
transforms it into an operation of
the play of manyness with manyness
without losing the sense of oneness
that keeps them in mutual
engagement. This is what is meant
by the operation of the knowledge by
identity in each one of the many in
relation to each other. But
actually it is the gnosis by
modified identity which keeps the
each both in their difference and in
their identity in dynamic unity or
alternative unity or disjunctive
unity as also conjunctive
diversity. Since these operations
do not fit into the net formulas of
definition, division, classification
etc. they are said to be irrational
– even as some numbers are
designated irrational numbers.
However, since they do exist their
relationship and derivation have to
be explained.
Sri Aurobindo’s logic of
the infinite both in the form of
identity and in the form of modified
identity helps to bridge the
problems of oneness and manyness.
If Jaina logic had developed rightly
it might have led to the formulation
of a conjunctive comprehensive
principle of Unity of its several
standpoints. But it has
unfortunately both in the
formulations of the saptabhangi as
also saptanayas seriously restricted
itself to the existential predicates
and to leads that are about
linguistic as possible. If it had
taken up the view that by putting
the several points of view together
one might suddenly be illumined by a
Unity that thereupon keeps them as
integral to one another, it would
have shown the birth of that type of
knowledge which we call insight,
which is not the sum of the parts or
sections but a revelation of truth.
However, committed as it was to the
unmediated knowledge as the
samyagdarsana – a direct vision by
the jiva in its absolute
immateriality – it could not accept
that it is something that is arrived
at by means of conjunction of
standpoints or make it mediated by
this process.this process.
Nor could Sri
Aurobindo’s supramental gnosis be
just the comprehensive putting
together of the several points of
view – of sense-data and so on. It
is a direct knowledge by Grace which
is the most real kind –it is
knowledge of things in their eternal
nature – it is a knowledge that is
of the self itself in its triple
poises of the one in all, all in one
and as the one that has become all
without separation into the
phenomenal trinity of
subject-object-knowledge.
The integral view severs
nothing, annuls nothing, it restores
to unity the divided, both in
organic as well as in the cosmic.
Perhaps it discovers that the
organic itself is a inherent form o
the Cosmic or transcosmic, and as
such analogies of the organic are
not ungemane to the transcosmic
itself. But the pan – organismic
conception may be reflected in the
Absolute, but it must be considered
to be something very different
also. The logic of such an Absolute
would have to explain all that are
subordinate to it both in the
spheres of consciousness and
unconscious (acit), and in the
interplay of both these also.
It is the logic of
revelation that can fully endorse
the integral wholeness that explains
the one-many problem in all its
multiple poises, and Sri Aurobindo
aims at presenting that picture to
the finite consciousness which would
help it to transcend itself.scend itself.scend itself. |